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Abstract: Building on Smith (1989), we describe the social processes surrounding a new 
financial OTC3 derivatives market, the market for credit derivatives. We show that in 
contradiction with more traditional derivatives, credit derivatives generate ambiguities of a 
cognitive and political nature. By conducting an in-depth longitudinal qualitative study from 
1996 to 2004, we document the efforts made by the promoters of the market to alleviate these 
ambiguities and show how the amount of resources needed results in the leadership of the 
most powerful. We thus provide a socially based explanation for the concentration and lack of 
transparency of the market. Our research exemplifies the contradictions between the 
rhetorical justification of financial innovations provided by financial theory and the empirical 
realities of a modern derivative market.  It suggests that the actual structure of the market 
might best be understood by paying attention to the way different cognitive and political 
communities react to these contradictions.  
 
Key words: Social studies of finance, social construction of value, financial innovation, OTC 
markets, cognitive and political ambiguities 
 
Introduction  
  
What relationship is there between the highly modern financial market for credit derivatives 
and the auction sale of a prize Kansas dairy cow? Although both involve some form of 
economic behaviour, the old-fashioned, if not exotic, ritual of auctions seems to be at odds 
with the style of transactions on one of the most modern and sophisticated derivatives 
markets.  However, appearances can sometimes be deceptive. 
 
Created around 1997, the credit derivatives market can be considered as an extension of other 
successful innovative financial markets, the first of which being the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE). Enhanced by the valuation model proposed by Black and Scholes (1973), 
Chicago’s options market rapidly spread around the globe4. Building on this success, financial 
                                                
1 We are most grateful to Richard Whitley, Senior Editor and the anonymous reviewers for their significant contribution to 
the improvement of the paper. We also thank Glenn Morgan, Sigrid Quack, Rodolphe Durand, Philippe Monin, Ellen 
O’Connor, Edith Ginglinger, Bernard Leca and participants at the EGOS 2006 colloquium in Bergen and at the EGOS 2007 
colloquium in Vienna for their advice and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article. We finally thank Esthelle 
Toure for research assistance.  
2 Both authors contributed equally to this study and are listed alphabetically.  
3 OTC (Over-the-Counter) markets are financial markets where trading occurs directly between two parties as opposed to 
exchange trading, which occurs on organized exchanges. While some OTC markets have enormous liquidity and transparent 
reporting systems, the market for credit derivatives is well known for its opacity. 
4 BIS, Statisics on derivatives, September 2007. 
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engineers soon realized the use they could make of the breakthrough and began to explore the 
potentialities of the new technology. Identifying the price variation of primary financial assets 
with “risk”, they proposed to create different kind of “derivatives”, in other words financial 
products whose value can be related to the price of a given underlying asset through complex 
à la Black and Scholes mathematical models. Credit derivatives result from an extension of 
this logic, in which the underlying asset is replaced by the amount of credit risk borne by a 
debt5. This market has since been expanding at a fast pace to an estimated amount outstanding 
in December 2006 of $28,838bn. 
 
Yet, while the options market and its mathematical apparatus served as theoretical smelter for 
the invention of credit derivatives, the contrast between the empirical realities on the option 
and credit derivatives markets is sharp. Options are highly standardized contracts traded 
worldwide on organized exchanges that provide transparent and instantaneous access to prices 
through automatic quotation systems.  On the other hand, credit derivatives are traded on an 
over-the-counter basis involving mainly private actors who conclude deals at nontransparent 
prices. In other words, while options markets appear highly standardized, liquid and 
transparent, the credit derivatives market remains irregular, opaque and concentrated.  
 
How can a single theoretical apparatus produce so dissimilar empirical realities? And how can 
one explain the specific features observed in the market structure of credit derivatives?  
 
We show in this paper that economic sociology can help to answer these questions. Focusing 
on the particular attributes of the credit derivatives themselves, we demonstrate that the 
absence of a simple relationship to a traded underlying asset makes these financial products 
truly specific, with numerous implications.  
 
First, while the event triggering the exercise of options is clearly defined (the stock price goes 
above or below the exercise price), this is far from being the case as regards credit derivatives. 
Related to this question comes the problem of defining exactly what a credit derivative 
actually is. While options technology pre-existed the actual launching of the options market in 
Chicago (MacKenzie and Millo 2003), credit derivatives appeared as a brand new concept. 
Questions were then raised as to whether they should be considered as financial products or as 
insurance contracts, to which they bear some resemblance. Numerous issues depend on the 
answer to this question such as who would be allowed to participate in the market and under 
what kind of regulation. The absence of any straightforward link to an underlying asset finally 
poses extremely intricate questions as regards the pricing of credit derivatives. The fact that 
stocks underlying options are traded on the market is crucial in the valuation formula 
proposed by Black and Scholes. The extension of Black and Scholes theory to credit 
derivatives is indeed far from being straightforward. Overall, the specificity of credit 
derivatives casts a doubt on the notion that they can, like options, be used to manage “risk”, in 
the sense financiers grant to the word. Following Knight (1921), one traditionally defines 
“risk” as a type of uncertainty that can be measured using probabilities, whereas “uncertainty” 
refers to future events on which no probability can reasonably be carried out. While risk in the 
Knightian sense seems acceptable as a description of the price variations of traded assets, the 
                                                
5 Although some credit derivatives are written on corporate or sovereign bonds, those underlying assets serve only as a 
reference. Their price variations are not directly linked to the credit event that will trigger the exercise of the credit derivative. 
Other credit derivatives are written on several reference entities. 
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variation of the credit risk borne by a given debt might have more to do with “uncertainty”, 
than with “risk”6.  
 
Consequently, many ambiguities surround credit derivatives, which leads us back to the 
example of the Kansas dairy cow.  
  
In his penetrating analysis of auction markets, Smith (1989) shows that many objects traded 
on auctions involve ambiguities of different kinds. When the goods at stake cannot be easily 
related to a standard market, or when ownership, allocation of goods and proper classification 
(Lounsbury and Crumley 2007) remain problematic, uncertainty prevails on the value of the 
goods to be exchanged. In such cases, Smith argues, the specific auction structure must be 
analyzed as the result of a social process by which actors collectively attempt to resolve 
ambiguities. He explains the variation in type of auctions using the variations in the type of 
ambiguities the actors have to face.  
 
Building on this analysis, and despite the apparent remoteness between some auction markets 
and modern derivatives trading, we propose to investigate the structure of the credit 
derivatives market by focusing on the many ambiguities faced by the actors on the market. 
We argue that this perspective allows a renewed understanding of the empirical contrasts 
observed on some derivatives markets. It is this need to solve ambiguity issues collectively 
(issues which differ from one market to another) that produces various cognitive and political 
communities that engage in a range of social processes shaping markets differently.  
 
Conducting an in-depth qualitative study beginning with the origin of the market for credit 
derivatives through to the end of 2004, we propose an explanation as to why this market so 
greatly differs from the ideal vision of financial markets, with its atomistic and equal 
investors, anonymously exchanging on the basis of widely transparent prices. We show that 
credit derivatives pose complex definitional and valuation issues. Our contribution is to 
demonstrate how, while the rhetorical justification of the innovation requires the involvement 
of as many actors as possible, the social processes required to handle ambiguities engenders 
concentration and opacity.  
 
The remainder of this article is divided into four parts. Using the main results of the social 
studies of finance, the first part focuses on the concept of the social construction of value on 
financial markets. The second part presents the research method, a longitudinal qualitative 
study over the period 1996-2004, taken from interviews with the principal actors of the 
market and of an analysis of secondary data. The third part consists of a study of the 
development of the market for credit derivatives, and of market shaping as an answer to 
ambiguities. The fourth, and last, part draws the principal conclusions of the research.  
 
1- The social construction of value on financial markets  
 
Financial markets are traditionally seen as the place where value is unequivocally set by the 
realization of Walrassian neoclassical economy. On securities exchanges, atomistic investors 
act as pure price takers, making their decisions on the basis of equilibrium prices. Economic 
sociology however challenges the view that value is unproblematic on financial markets and 
proposes to see it as the result of complex social constructions well worth exploring.  
 
                                                
6 For a historical account of the notion of risk and probabilities, see Reith (1999).  
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Kregel (1995) observes that Walras and Marshall modeled their divergent price theories on 
two real-world institutions: the Paris Bourse for Walras and the London Stock Exchange for 
Marshall. The diverse organization of the two stock exchanges might explain the dissimilarity 
in the theories and raises the question of the evolution towards an optimal market 
organization. Conducting a historical analysis of the evolution of the New York and London 
stock exchanges Kregel (1995) concludes that, although facing similar problems of external 
competition, the two stock exchanges produced responses which have led to different 
organizational forms showing no sign of convergence towards a uniform structure. Even in 
the purest case of application of neoclassical economy, the pricing process thus appears to 
result from a specific social organization, whose universality remains surprisingly limited.  
 
Using NYSE, American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ data, Zuckerman (1999) 
demonstrates the necessity to understand the precise social process of analysts’ coverage to 
account for the market prices of public American firms in the stock market over the years 
1985-1994. He shows that stock prices in this period were significantly discounted for firms 
who did not succeed in getting coverage by the securities analysts specializing in their 
industry. Similarly, Zuckerman (2004) explores the impact of a stock’s position in the 
industry-based classification that analysts use on the market. Evidencing the fact that stocks 
that are difficult to classify exhibit more trading volume and higher volatility, he provides 
explanations related to the difficulty that investors of these stocks had in interpreting 
ambiguous economic information and converging on a common evaluation. The classificatory 
system can thus be seen as an imperfect functionalist social solution to market participants’ 
uncertainty, and its impact on market prices as an unintended consequence.  Focusing on 
arbitrage trading, Beunza et al (2006) conducted an in-depth study of the social processes 
involved in these specific investment strategies. They illustrate the importance of trust and 
information exchange as well as the informal norms of conduct involved in the process, and 
show the efforts arbitrageurs must expend in order to convince others (investment bank 
managers, for example) of the correctness of their theories. In arbitrage strategies, price 
clearly appears as the product of complex and specific material and social interactions. Other 
works focus on the social processes involved in the slow adoption of Black and Scholes’s 
valuation model on the options market created in Chicaco in 1973 (MacKenzie and Millo 
2003; Smith 2007). They show that acceptation of the model required time, the use of some 
scientific rhetoric (the model was highly mathematical and its promoters emphasized its 
modernity) and specific market conditions which financially favored its early adopters. The 
Black and Scholes model was finally incorporated into technical mechanisms, thus creating 
the very phenomena it described (Callon 1998; MacKenzie 2004, 2006).  
 
All these contributions of economic sociology provide in-depth analyses of the social 
construction of value on financial markets and suggest the existence of interrelations between 
market organization and the social processes required to achieve pricing. In this context, they 
also indicate that progress makes mastering the specific technicalities of various markets a 
necessity if one is to conduct fine-tuned investigations of the precise social construction of 
various market structures (Whitley 2006; Zelizer 1994).  
 
We suggest using the insights provided by economic sociology on the social construction of 
financial markets in order to study a new, and quantitatively particularly successful market, 
the market for credit derivatives. Observing that this market bears strikingly little empirical 
resemblance with the options market, the research question we start from is thus the 
following: How could the theoretical apparatus developed by Black and Scholes (1973) 
produce such dissimilar market structures?  
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We propose to look for an answer to this question by studying the social construction of value 
that is observable on the market for credit derivatives. We argue that the starting point of the 
analysis is found by taking full account of the most striking difference between options on 
stocks and credit derivatives; this difference lying in the absence of a direct or simple link 
with any underlying asset in the case of credit derivatives.  
 
We posit that this presents a certain number of practical problems for the actors of the market. 
A first series of questions are related to definitional issues. As noted by MacKenzie and Millo 
(2003), the CBOE developed on the basis of a small ad hoc existing market. Therefore, the 
definition of an option was widely agreed upon from the start. Definitional issues are more 
problematic in the case of credit derivatives given the absence of any simple link with a 
quoted underlying asset. The triggering event, which decides whether an option on a stock 
will be exercised, is the passage of the stock price above or below a given exercise price. In 
the case of credit derivatives, the identification of the triggering event is more problematic. 
Another kind of definitional problem lies in the legal qualification issue. Options had a legal 
status when they began to be traded on the CBOE. The situation is different for credit 
derivatives which could be considered either as financial products or as insurance contracts 
with which they bear some similarities (de Goede 2004). The consequences of having one 
definition prevail over the other (Zelizer 1979) are significant for various categories of actors, 
making the alleviation of this ambiguity a crucial point for the development of the market.  
 
A second series of difficulties is related to valuation problems. Strikingly, the performative 
role played by the Black and Scholes model in framing the options markets has no equivalent 
as regards credit derivatives. Overcoming the absence of any direct link with a traded 
underlying asset proves extremely difficult given the core role played by this issue in Black 
and Scholes’ theory. No reference model has succeeded in becoming established and the price 
of exchanged contracts result from nontransparent interactions between private actors which, 
given the concentration of the markets, are not numerous. Various actors complain about 
prices not being widely observable, especially for the more customized transactions, and even 
when they are (in the case of more standardized contracts), they are not highly reliable, as 
liquidity remains doubtful. 
 
We propose to study the way in which actors in the credit derivatives market have confronted 
definitional and valuation issues (Smith 2007) stemming from the very peculiar design of the 
product. By so doing, we extend Smith’s (1989) vision of auctions as inherently social 
processes for resolving definitional ambiguities to a more modern and sophisticated financial 
market. In particular, we show that the social response of actors to the ambiguities faced 
actually explain the shape of the market as it now stands. 
 
 
2- Methodology 
 
This article is based on a longitudinal qualitative study of the emerging activity of credit 
derivatives from the mid-1990’s to 2004. Our aim is to contribute to the understanding of the 
development and functioning of this financial market. Inductive logic remains dominant in 
our research design (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Strauss and Corbin 1994) and qualitative 
procedures were appropriate for many reasons (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006: 31). First, the 
process observed in this financial market constituted a complex social setting in which causal 
dynamics were not immediately apparent. Second, analysis involving historical processes and 
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such dynamic events are best studied through use of inductive techniques by which event 
sequences are clarified. Contextualization, vivid description, dynamic structuring of the 
organizational members’ socially constructed world and the worldviews of the people under 
study (Maguire, Lawrence and Hardy 2004; Lee 1999: 43) were of critical importance.  
 
 
2.1 Sources of data 
 
Our approach focuses on how French actors took part in the development of the market. 
Among the 75 financial institutions surveyed by FitchRatings in 20067 as actors playing a 
major role in the credit derivatives market worldwide, three French banks (BNP Paribas, 
Société Générale and Calyon) consistently rank between tenth and twenty-second from 2002 
to 2005. French banks are acknowledged in FitchRatings’ special report (2006) to be “the 
biggest players in the European Credit Derivatives market”. Moreover, the type of study 
conducted in this paper requires a refined analysis of the institutional context, which is 
difficult to achieve on a global basis. French actors offer an interesting standpoint from which 
to understand the structuring of the European Credit Derivative Market.  
 
Although it covers a 10-year period of development of the market, our interviews were 
conducted during one year and are based on a retrospective analysis. This methodology has its 
disadvantages (MacKenzie and Millo 2003: 112). Unlike studies that use participant or direct 
observation (Abolafia 1996; Jacobides 2005), there is a risk of ex-post rationalization or 
memory bias in retrospective interviews. However, we drew upon numerous other sources of 
data (secondary sources such as documents, archival materials and professional press articles) 
allowing us to gain an in-depth knowledge of this field. The opportunity to compare and 
contrast the different positions of diverse actors in order to obtain a triangulated cross-section 
provided a certain degree of control over results by widening the range of data sources.  
 
Informants 
The central activity for data collection was individual interviews. As in MacKenzie and Millo 
(2003) and MacKenzie (1990), interviewing was necessary because neither financial/trade 
press sources nor archival sources were sufficient in addressing our research questions. 
Various categories of actors were interviewed between 2004 and 2005: traders and market 
practitioners in banks, regulators and experts in Paris and in London. The actors interviewed 
were members of la Commission Bancaire (the Banking Commission), la Commission de 
Contrôle des Assurances (the Insurance Control Commission), l’Autorité de Régulation des 
Marchés Financiers (the Financial Market Regulating Authority, the SEC equivalent), the 
ISDA8, and various banks (Société Générale, BNP Paribas, Exane Asset Management, Fortis 
Banque). Financial market experts, legal experts and economists were also interviewed. A 
total of 35 interviews were conducted: 8 with the regulators, 14 with traders from investment 
banks, 4 with mutual and hedge funds, 3 with insurance companies, 2 with members of ISDA 
and 4 with experts. Interviews were semi-structured and focused upon the most important 
actors in the market, the analysis of their activities and their relationship with regulatory and 
normalization institutions. The five main question areas were: What was the origin of the 
                                                
7 FitchRatings, Special report, Global Credit derivatives Survey, September 2006 
8 International Swaps and Derivatives Association: the ISDA is a global trade association representing leading participants in 
the privately negotiated derivatives industry, a business which includes interest rates, currency, commodity, credit and equity 
swaps, as well as related products such as caps, collars, floors and swaptions. ISDA was chartered in 1985 and numbers over 
650 member institutions from 44 countries on six continents. Its board is primarily composed of banks. For a comprehensive 
study of the role of ISDA on international financial markets, see Morgan (2008).  
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market? What type of resistance did the banks meet in developing this new market? What 
were the main crises and events in this market? What are the relationships between the actors? 
What are the main operating routines in this market? 
 
Interviews lasted between 1½ and 3 hours and were taped and transcribed. All the interviews 
involved the two researchers of this study (see Appendix 1 for a complete list of interviews).  
 
Secondary sources 
Many categories of archival information were consulted. We reviewed the studies of the 
Banking Commission in France, FitchRatings publications, Bank of England publications, 
Bank of International Settlements and documents from ISDA (see  Appendix 2 for a complete 
list of documents consulted).  These materials confirmed the chronology of events, gave 
details not available from interviews and provided textual accounts of debates and 
discussions.   
 
Secondary sources also included a review of press articles. The criteria of specialization of the 
journals in the domain of financial information were used for selection. Three French 
professional sources were chosen: La Tribune, l’Agefi and the journal Banque (Banque 
Magazine, Banque et Droit, Banque et Marché). These reviews are those that are mainly read 
by the French professionals of financial markets. The articles were chosen from the study 
period 1996-2004. 1996 was the date from which the French media started to publish articles 
on credit derivatives. In total, 199 articles made up our database, beginning with research on 
the term “credit derivative.” Through these documents, we were able to reconstitute events.  
 
2.2 Data Analysis 
Following Miles and Huberman (1994) and Yin (1989), we arranged the data into 
chronological account in order to produce a "facts database". We then tried to capture the 
“justificatory accounts” of different actors (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006: 32) engaged in the 
development of this market. 
 
One of the authors, a finance specialist, conducted an analysis of these accounts, first 
identifying sentences and words commonly used by actors to justify their activity and to 
explain the growth of the market. For example, references to risk management, diversification 
of risks but also to size, volume of exchanges, and market liquidity were made very frequently 
by banks. We identified an initial set of narratives, reviewed them carefully and interpreted 
the data using what we knew about the subject based on documents, press articles and 
interviews (Berg 2004; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006: 32). We were then able to analyze the 
way actors handled ambiguities. We focused on five main themes. The first three refer to 
definitional problems: 1/ economic justification of the market, i.e. the efforts to show that 
credit derivatives are an instrument of risk management, 2/ lobbying dynamics, i.e. the efforts 
made by banks to promote the product, especially through legal qualification and 3/ 
normalization and valorization processes, i.e. the will of the actors to give credit derivatives a 
recognizable framework and valorization devices. The following two themes refer to the 
constitution of communities on this market: 4/ heterogeneity of cultural and technical 
equipment of actors, i.e. the absence of a common cognitive framework for the actors of the 
market, and 5/ conflicts of interests, i.e. the tensions and political conflicts between actors.  
 
We used then other data sources, to verify the categories and in particular, professional press 
articles. These data were collected after we had found the emerging themes from interviews, 
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documents and reports. From the 199 articles analyzed (see Appendix 3), we created a 
dictionary for the entire corpus using computer-assisted textual analysis software (SPAD-T). 
We obtained 8854 words, which were organized into a dictionary of 73 words (see Appendix 
4). It was then possible to verify the main actors of the market and their specific vocabulary. 
Based on this analysis, we observed that only certain types of questions are more particularly 
put forward by certain types of actors.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3- Case Analysis 
 
The development of the credit derivatives market is presented first. We then go on to analyze 
the market-shaping process that results from the different ambiguities the actors must handle.   
 
 
3.1 History and development 
The first credit derivatives appeared in the early 1990’s in the United States. Derivatives are 
typically financial instruments which are related to a risk, require little or no initial 
investments and may not be settled. While for interest rate swaps, the risk resides in the 
movements of interest rates, and for commodity derivatives in commodity price, credit 
derivatives would be written on the general credit risk of a reference entity. This risk would 
be materialized by the occurrence of certain events, called credit events, which include 
bankruptcy, failure to pay, restructuring etc. In practice, the innovation resides in isolating the 
credit risk from a loan in order to be able to trade it on the market. In this way, the creditor 
(purchaser of the protection) can transfer the associated credit risk to another party (the 
vendor of the protection) while still retaining the debt on his/her balance sheet. Typically, the 
protection buyer will pay a certain premium to the protection seller, receiving compensation 
in the case where a credit event occurs. Theoretically, credit derivatives are also innovative 
for another reason. While they result from an extension of the standard derivative technology, 
they do not rely straightforwardly on a traded underlying asset. 
The principal actors in this market are large investment banks, insurance companies and 
mutual fund companies9. Market information is based on estimates or surveys among 
participants and these estimates differ greatly. While investment bank primarily act as 
protection buyers to hedge their own exposure, the development of the market also allows 
them to sell protection according to their anticipations of the credit risk of various reference 
entities. Insurance companies and mutual funds are typically protection sellers, using credit 
derivatives as an instrument of diversification, which they hope would generate interesting 
returns. 
 
Other significant actors are regulators, who play an important role on the market. In France, 
they are organized in distinct bodies for insurance companies (Commission de Contrôle des 
Assurances), for banks (Commission Bancaire) and for management companies (Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers-AMF). The national regulators are also organized into international 
authorities, as part of the Joint Forum created in 1999.  
 
                                                
9 See Deutche Bank Research, Current issues, June 2004, Credit derivatives, effects on the stability of financial markets. 
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Finally, the particular role played by the ISDA in the promotion and the development of the 
market should be noted. This global trade association representing leading participants in the 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets has over 650 member institutions worldwide. As 
we shall see, its role in the development of new OTC markets is crucial10 and mainly revolves 
around documentation and promotion of new products. 
 
While the appearance of the first true credit derivative is difficult to trace back, 1997 can be 
chosen as the starting point for the development of the market, at least in Europe.  That year, 
JP Morgan proposed a reference model to price and handle credit derivatives, the 
CreditMetrics model. In England, the ISDA had credit derivatives legally acknowledged as 
financial instruments, which launched the process of market development. Its ensuing growth 
was extremely rapid. From outstanding loans of 180 billion dollars in 1997, the notional 
amounts on which the derivative products are written, reached a record volume of 28,838 
billion dollars in 2006, according to the Bank of International Settlements statistics.  
Estimates for the coming years suggest sustained growth.  (see Graph 1). The chronology in 
Appendix 5 reveals the main steps of the development of the market. 
 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
It must be noted that despite the great number of potential actors, the market remains 
extremely concentrated. A survey carried out on a sample of 27 companies in 2004 by the 
Banking Commission, the Insurance Controlling Commission and the Financial Market 
Authority helped to reveal the structure of the market as well as the concentration on the 
French market. 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
One figure in itself reveals the high concentration of the global market for credit derivatives. 
Six main banks alone continue to realize 50% of worldwide transactions. According to Fitch 
Ratings, the top ten counterparts in the world (all banks) represent 86% of the sold and bought 
volume totals11.  
 
How can this concentration be explained?  The next section proposes to look for an answer in 
the specific social processes observable on the credit derivatives market.  
 
 
 
3.2 Market structuring as an answer to ambiguities 
 
                                                
10 See also Morgan (2008) 
11 Fitch Ratings, Special report, Global Credit derivatives Survey, September 2006. 
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Although credit derivatives were designed within the paradigm of the financial theory of risk, 
they entail a number of difficulties that were largely overlooked by their creators. For 
example, they were far from being well-defined from the start. Diffusion was hampered by 
definitional issues and contractual uncertainties. Transparency appeared questionable as the 
first deals were made on a private basis within a circle involving but a few investment banks. 
It thus soon became apparent that the market for credit derivatives did not naturally match the 
theoretical description used to justify its creation, and that convergence could only be 
obtained through commitment and efforts on the part of the product promoters. These efforts 
can best be understood as attempts to deal with the multiple and fundamental ambiguities 
confronted by the various market actors. Two main problems remained: definitional issues 
needed to be solved and product diffusion enhanced.  
 
Problems of definition  
 
One of the peculiarities of the credit derivatives financial innovation is that the very definition 
of the product was at the beginning (and to a certain extent still is) problematic. Definitional 
ambiguities had to be removed at three different levels.  
 
The first is that of legal qualification. The specificity of credit risk - a risk materialized, not by 
the price variation of an underlying asset but by the arrival of a specific event - could lead one 
to consider credit derivatives as a kind of insurance contract. For banks, which were the 
promoters of the product, it was incumbent to combat this vision for two reasons. Insurance 
contracts could only be treated by insurance companies in most European countries and 
therefore could not be treated by banking actors. In addition, the qualification of credit 
derivatives in financial products would allow mutual funds, especially hedge funds, to access 
these products. This was seen as necessary for the development of a market which, in order to 
exist, needs sellers as well as buyers of protection.     
  
Promoters of credit derivatives chose to approach this issue by gathering within ISDA. In 
June 1997 the ISDA succeeded in obtaining the legal decision they wanted from Robin Potts 
QC,12 mainly that credit default swaps were not insurance contracts but financial products. 
This was unanimously acknowledged as one of the great successes of the organization; what 
was at stake was of primordial importance. 
 
“This point is essential as a bank cannot sell insurance. Without this ‘Potts’ opinion’, there would have 
been no market at all. This clarification was essential. The question of the qualification of the product 
had quickly been posed by the Financial Law Panel of the Bank of England (the regulator at that time).” 
(A representative of the ISDA)  
 
The intensity of the debate around the legal qualification of credit derivatives was also 
illustrated in France when,  in 1999, a law thesis was devoted to the question (Gauvin, 1999). 
Later, in 2003, A. Gauvin maintained that credit derivatives could come under the gaming and 
gambling laws. Gauvin noted the way in which both French and British legal systems adopted 
legal qualification for financial products, and attributed the result to the victory of economic 
matters over purely legal thinking: 
 
                                                
12 Robin Potts’ employer is the London based international Law firm Allen and Overy, which shares a common address in 
London with the ISDA European Office, One Bishops Square, London E1 6A0. 
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“The strength of financial stakes which (derivative products) represent is such that their being put into 
question in a given financial place or a particular country could have harmful consequences for the 
banking industry and local finance.”  
 
In France, the debate on the legal qualification of credit derivatives had also become focused 
on the possibility for Mutual fund companies (OPCVM) to use credit derivatives. This access 
of Mutual funds, of critical importance to promoters of the product, was validated by decree 
on December 10, 2002 after four years of discussions and consultations. It expressively 
authorized Mutual funds to sign credit derivatives as over-the-counter contracts. The 
ambiguity on legal qualification thus appeared to have been the first issue that needed solving. 
While several potential responses to the problem could have been envisaged, the prevailing 
solution was the one promoted by the community of investment banks, collectively acting to 
lobby the regulator. This social process is seen by promoters of the market as having yielded 
efficient results. 
 
“Our lobbying achieved its goal: credit derivatives are no longer qualified as credit operations and no 
longer come under the banking monopoly. The legal qualification debate has been resolved.” (A trader)  
 
However, it is highly likely that non-bank actors noticed whose victory it actually was. From 
the beginning, and continuing through to the resolution of the legal qualification issue, credit 
derivatives were taken in hand by a specific cognitive and political community, that of banks 
as opposed to other actors of the market. 
 
A second definitional ambiguity arose from the lack of standardization which prevailed when 
the market was created. Over-the-counter markets can not develop without precise definitions 
of how the products will work in practice. Contractual risk, if too high will hamper the take- 
off of any financial innovation. As regards credit derivatives, those who decided to take this 
problem into their own hands were obviously the promoters of the market, and again they 
choose to handle it using the far reaching experience that ISDA had developed over the years 
on other OTC markets. The process of standardization, however, was neither simple nor brief. 
During the development of the market, generally as a result of legal disagreements, the ISDA 
was forced to change its standards and norms several times.  
 
“The pragmatic approach of the ISDA must be praised: every crisis, incident or dispute is an 
opportunity to reconsider and to improve the documentation. The ISDA has demonstrated its great 
flexibility and its ability to adapt to events.” (A legal expert) 
  
“Certain crises and disputes, such as the Conseco, RealTrack, Parmalat, and LTCM affairs and the crisis 
in Argentina, meant we had to re-examine the documentation. The ISDA has worked very hard to 
clarify things – in particular those which concern the credit event that trigger credit derivative payments, 
as we have examples of cases in the U.S. where credit derivatives payments were unduly asked  – 
without the default being acknowledged by the two parties.” (An ISDA representative) 
 
This long-lasting process resulted in the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement becoming the standard 
form governing future transactions. On the February 10, 2003, the ISDA again renewed its 
documentation relating to credit derivatives by publishing new definitions, The 2003 ISDA 
Credit Definitions.  
 
“The first market problem was the absence of formalization of frameworks and definitions. It was 
therefore urgent to put ISDA documentation in place. ISDA norms represent a common language.” (A 
trader) 
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A third, and last, definitional issue of the credit derivatives market, which proved especially 
intricate, was that of pricing. Regarding this question, a discrepancy materialized between 
what the theory predicted and what could be done in practice. The financial theory of risk 
used by credit derivatives designers assumes that credit risk can be assimilated to a typical 
financial risk. As a result, credit derivatives are theoretically to be valued using the 
conventional mathematical models. However, setting a tariff on credit risk which materializes 
through credit events, is practically very difficult. The failure of the CreditMetrics model 
publicized, on April 2, 1997, by JP Morgan, demonstrates this problem. “The first portfolio 
model destined for the management of credit risk13” was supposed to facilitate understanding 
and use of the new credit risk management instruments. This ambitious project failed and 
CreditMetrics never played the unifying role that JP Morgan had dreamed of. Banks 
continued to resort to various internal models, implicitly acknowledging the failure of their 
attempt to clarify the valorization ambiguity inherent in credit derivatives14.  
 
“There are worries about mispricing as there are no good pricing models. Prudence is essential in a 
context where one is frightened of the weakening of the financial system worldwide. The technique is 
quite simple when the underlying asset is unique and when it is quoted on an Exchange, but otherwise 
we don’t have adequate instruments.” (A regulator)   
 
Although the ISDA fought particularly to obtain recognition of internal evaluation models15 
by the regulators of the Basel 2 framework, the combat ended in defeat. It led, however, to 
renewed efforts in Basel 3.   
 
“Within the framework of a working group preparing Basel 3, the ISDA will produce a study showing 
the growing convergence of models which increasingly achieve the same results. Concerning the model 
selected by Basel 2, the ISDA is not in a position to react.” (A representative of the ISDA) 
 
As things stand at present, the absence of a consensus regarding pricing method, most likely 
weakens banks’ capacity to rally the other actors of the market around the idea that credit 
derivatives are beneficial to all. This leads us to the second broad category of uncertainty that 
actors of the credit derivatives markets had to face. 
 
Who is to benefit from the market? 
 
The rhetorical justification for the creation of credit derivatives relies on the general assertion 
of the financial theory of risk, according to which the marketization of new risks is inherently 
advantageous. It is supposed to be beneficial to all financial actors, and more generally to the 
financial and economic system as a whole. The case of credit derivatives however, shows that 
in reality, ambiguities might remain as to who is to benefit from the development of the 
market. The interest of the product for the banks promoting it was obvious. First, since 1988 
and the Cooke ratio16 implementation, international regulation had made it obligatory for 
banks to cover the risk of their assets with sufficient capital. This lessens the profitability for 
                                                
13 JP Morgan Chase 2001 Annual Report 
14 This difficulty could perhaps be related to the notion that Maki (1992) termed isolation. Isolation refers to the high level of 
abstraction of the theoretical models used in contexts that require many more details to be adequately described or fully 
understood. (Whitley, 2008) 
15 In other terms, the doctrine of the ISDA is that it should be the banks themselves who define the method of calculating the 
risk represented by their activities in derivative products. Regulators remain reticent when faced with the use of internal 
models. The key reason for disagreement is the absence in the case of credit derivatives of an independent liquid and 
transparent market for credit risk. 
16 The Cooke ratio is also known as the Capital adequacy ratio.  It is the limit on the risk-weighted credit exposure allowed to 
each financial institution depending on its capital base. From 2005, it was progressively replaced by the McDonough ratios. 
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their shareholders, which induced banks to transfer part of their risk to markets, making so 
called risk management a strategic activity.  In addition, credit derivatives also offered them 
the more traditional advantages of financial innovations. It might be sold to new customers 
with comfortable margins, as the product was new, complex and at least to begin with, not 
offered by all competitors. While promoters have thus a conspicuous interest in diffusing the 
innovation to sellers, as well as buyers of protection, and in sharing the risk as much as 
possible, other actors tended to suspect the innovation to be potentially detrimental to all but 
its promoters. The promoters, therefore, were led to provide varied responses to alleviate 
suspicion. 
 
One category of customer was particularly resistant to the effort of promoters. Insurers tended 
to suspect American banks of having created the market in the first place in order to transfer 
their bad risks to European insurance companies, who would be at a disadvantage through the 
asymmetry of information.  
 
“Bankers have often overcharged insurers who were not aware of the size of the risk because they didn’t 
have enough technical knowledge.” (A regulator) 
 
This circumspect attitude, which seemed to have originated from a few unfortunate affairs 
dating from the early days of the market involving re-insurers and insurers,17 led them to 
almost completely leave the credit derivatives market which had become quite illegitimate 
within the insurance industry.   
 
“The insurance companies do not see any real interest in this market. They have the impression that the 
market is not very liquid, has not reached maturity, and they are not very enthusiastic. Insurance 
companies are not promoters of credit derivatives.” (A regulator)    
 
 “These products are somewhat diabolized by insurance companies. They are not put to the forefront in 
financial communication. Insurance companies are afraid that their stock exchange price will fall if they 
communicate about using credit derivatives; there is considerable mistrust. It must be said that the heart 
of the job of insurance companies is to provide people with the rates they promised.” (A regulator)  
 
In the pursuit of their own interests, banks were also confronted with the regulators. 
Regulatory capital had indeed been defined in order to meet the regulators’ concern about 
systemic risk. Regulators were thus bound to be cautious in the face of credit derivatives and 
convincing them was not an easy task, all the less so as their concerns were built on the 
potential opportunism on the part of credit derivatives sellers. 
 
“Obviously, the problem is the trader who sells nuclear waste, and then once the bloke is irradiated he 
finds the trader has already taken off with his bonus in his pocket.” (A trader) 
 
“We no longer know where the risk is with credit derivatives. The asymmetry of information between 
vendor and buyer is considerable. Some buyers do not even know what they are holding in their hands.” 
(A regulator)   
 
 “The public at large does not have direct access to credit derivatives and is not always aware of the 
amount of risk that it represents. The difficulty is to get developed and adapted financial information. 
This is true for all markets but more so for credit derivatives as banks keep their ‘secret of fabrication’ 
                                                
17 The insurance and reinsurance actors have been the largest recipients of credit risk transferred from other sectors. Some 
regulators have expressed worries about the (re)insurance sector’s growing exposure to cross-sector credit risk transfers. 
These worries also extended to the commercial rating agencies and other market watchers. This sparked some responses from 
the reinsurance industry. For example, on November 2001, the French reinsurance group SCOR had discontinued its credit 
derivative insurance activities. It had increased loss provisions by 30 millions euros to 131 millions euros in the third quarter 
of 2002 and it had taken an estimated 2.5 years for the exposure to run off.  
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close to their chest. This is a technique which justifies having reference documents, and as the banks 
release little information, there is an absence of formatting.” (A regulator)   
 
“The risk of asymmetries of information is real as the bank retains a higher degree of information than 
its correspondent. The buyers do not really have the same means at their disposition as vendors of risk.  
(…) the question is: are we not again going to transfer risks towards households and businesses? (…) In 
a period of prosperity, they (credit derivatives) boost performance, which attracts subscribers. Only 
there have been examples of unfortunate experiences in certain European countries (for example in Italy 
with Parmalat shares and individual investors turned to the banks for explanations) (…) The Italian 
example is not reassuring from this point of view.” (A regulator)    
 
Promoters of the product did not remain inactive in the face of suspicion. They engaged in 
various endeavors to alleviate the ambiguity as to who was to benefit from the market and to 
reassure other actors regarding potential opportunism of their part. 
 
First, an analysis of the specialized press permits quantitative evaluation of the effort made by 
banks to convince potential clients. Between 1996 and 2004, 77% of the articles written by 
professional financiers publishing as experts in the specialized press, were devoted to the 
presentation of credit derivatives as instruments of excellent risk management performance 
with 35% of the articles coming explicitly from banks (see Appendix 3). The advantages of 
credit derivatives for potential clients were put forward in terms of diversification and 
profitability. 
 
In a discussion, when one of his colleagues stated that the market starting point was built on 
the desire of large investment banks to respond to the tightening of international banking 
regulations in 1998, a representative of the ISDA stated: 
 
“I am not sure that this was the starting point. (….). The market existed before (….) Another reason for 
the birth of the market was the relative blockage of the interbanking market. Banks played on a market 
of concentrated swaps and the counterparty risks were great. Credit derivatives appeared as an 
instrument of risk diversification (….) It was also one way of offering certain clients higher returns by 
proposing tailor-made products.” (An ISDA representative)  
 
Other affirmative voices supported the same view:  
 
“What is important is to create new products for investors. We are always looking for new kinds of 
assets. It is a question of diversification.” (A trader) 
 
“To begin with, it was a question of hedging. Then followed acceleration in the market which came 
from the question of investments.” (A trader)  
 
Second, banks got actively involved in collaborative actions to enhance market liquidity and, 
as a consequence, price transparency. They resorted to two main actions.  
 
In 2002, some banks joined together to produce standard product indices. The construction of 
indices is common practice in financial markets and it was hoped that credit risk indices 
would improve price transparency by giving clear signals to the market on the credit risk 
market price. The idea was to use the relative standardization of the leading product - the 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) - in order to create a basket of CDS’s dealt worldwide, and to 
furnish an average price of the operation which could be referred to at any moment. Two of 
the main promoters, JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley were the first to independently launch 
two indices constructed from the CDS market in 2002. In 2003, these two indices joined 
together and created the TRAC-X index, whereas another group of banks (which included 
Deutsche Bank, ABN Amro, then Citigroup and Société Générale) launched, in competition, 
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an index called iBOXX. In April 2004, the two competing indices joined up again. What we 
observe is thus an interbank alliance, created to tackle the perceived ambiguity on the 
reliability of market prices.  
 
Enhancing perceived transparency was also attempted through the organization of the market 
in two distinct market segments, with the first participating in the liquidity of the second. The 
first segment is one of standardized products, where the aim is to develop and maintain 
transparency and liquidity. CDS represent the majority of that segment, which investment 
banks include in what they call flow markets. 
 
“Market techniques have been standardized. The ISDA has declared what options are possible. We 
chose termly dates in order to have more liquidity.” (A trader) 
  
“In 2003, CDS trading joined together with bond trading: i.e. flow credit.” (A trader)  
 
As the development of this standardized segment impairs margins, investment banks also 
continue to develop a second market segment, consisting of structured products, otherwise 
known as tailor-made. The liquidity of the less profitable flow segment, if sufficient, is 
expected to warrant the applicability of the traditional financial theory of risk to credit risk by 
providing an observable market price for risk. Practically, despite the efforts to produce 
market prices that could serve as quotes (which are transmitted to all banks through means 
fine-tuned by Lombard, BNP in the form of a Reuters page, or by JP Morgan in the form of a 
Bloomberg function) doubt remains on the reliability of the obtained data.  
 
“It’s an over-the-counter market, more or less liquid. The sales argument here is one of liquidity but it’s 
wishful thinking.” (A regulator) 
 
“Each bank to its method:  mark-to-market prices remain somewhat divergent.” (A trader) 
 
 
Third, banks engaged in lobbying actions towards the regulators. National regulators were 
targeted first. 
 
“At the beginning, it was a question of credit establishments wanting credit derivatives market 
instruments legally recognized. Banks laid siege on supervisors to obtain a reduction in capital charges 
off their balance sheet (…). To begin with the approach was not coordinated internationally. There were 
informal discussions but each country chose its own way of dealing.” (A representative of the 
Commission Bancaire) 
 
At the international level, banks again chose to put their weight against the regulators within 
the ISDA. The ISDA had very significant means at its disposition:  
 
“At a global level the ISDA has colossal clout, they pay lawyers worldwide, all the profession joins, and 
they lobby the regulators.” (A trader) 
 
At the organization level, the construction of demand, and the alleviation of suspicion on the 
part of other actors required huge investments of technical and human resources. Most of the 
actions taken emanated from the small number of sufficiently large and powerful investment 
banks.  In this respect, the Société Générale appeared as a particularly well-equipped actor 
among French banks, whereas JP Morgan represented the precursor in the promotion of the 
worldwide credit derivatives market. Thanks to their technical and human resources, these 
two banks had at their disposition a particularly vast capacity for promotion, according them a 
key role in this market.  
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“The Société Générale is a very powerful actor which does a lot of lobbying. The doctrine of the 
Fédération des Banques Françaises comes from the  Société Générale lobby. They impose their way of 
seeing things on everyone and some – mostly competitors – complain about this fact.” (A legal expert) 
 
“The Société Générale has battalions of legal experts just like the American banks, a large number of 
legal PhD’s, who are really very good. Not only do they master the product technically but they are well 
organized.” (A legal expert) 
 
“There has been an effort of systematic promotion by JP Morgan. They have been consistent in their 
efforts, putting huge resources into manpower and technology. They very quickly became rapid in 
dealing with these products.”(A trader) 
 
All these resources seemed necessary to both convince potential clients and to socially 
construct the demand for credit derivatives. Significantly, promoters of the product see 
cognitive issues as central to the process and sometimes as their main restriction. 
 
“It has to be said that it is a market of “nerds” who have years of study behind them, who are engineers. 
They find it interesting because it’s complicated and that credit derivatives are more engaging than 
interest rate derivatives.” (A trader)   
 
 “Very few people really understand what credit derivatives really are (….) To establish a legitimacy of 
the market, we lobbied, did demonstrations to explain how it worked to clients, we organized 
conferences within the AGEFI framework – a formidable lobbying mechanism. We also published 
articles in the AGEFI and in Banque et Droit. We did everything, in terms of clients – especially mutual 
fund companies.” (A trader) 
 
“It was primarily a question of discussing with clients, of education, of de-mystifying or popularizing 
complicated documentation.” (A trader)  
  
Bankers complained about the way insurance companies regarded credit derivatives, seeing 
them as hardly concerned by the ISDA process and just as satisfied to apply their usual 
regulations. They explained the long lasting tendency of insurers to consider credit derivatives 
as rather “heretical” by emphasizing cultural determinants. They also complain about the 
cultural apprehension of the regulator:  
 
“This is a new activity, very technical, conceptually disconcerting. One has to justify oneself frequently 
to the regulators and each others’ positions are often restricting when one considers the complexity of 
the product.” (A trader)  
 
“The regulator does not understand the product very well; he doesn’t say it’s not allowed but he doesn’t 
say it is allowed either.” (A legal expert)   
 
“The regulator’s power to bring prejudice is quite strong. The regulatory environment can be considered 
as an obstacle, which slows business down. The biggest obstacle, in any case, is the cultural 
apprehension of many people who spend a disproportionate amount of time in controlling credit 
derivatives.” (A trader). 
 
What our analysis shows, however, is that at the heart of the diffusion issue is the unresolved 
question of who is going to benefit from the innovation. As long as it is not handled 
collectively by the different categories of actors, but taken in charge by a given category of 
them, this category is likely to be perceived by others as a political community defending its 
own interest. The refusal by the Spanish authorities to allow mutual funds in Spain to 
subscribe to credit derivatives is an example of the limited trust granted by regulators to 
investment banks in general. Similarly, in France, the AMF gave authorization very 
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prudently. Only 20 mutual fund companies out of the 520 operating in Paris have so far 
received authorization.  
 
To summarize, while the vision borne by the financial theory of risk is that any innovation of 
interest should be readily adopted by various categories of actors of the market, the empirical 
realities of the market for credit derivatives appears fundamentally different. Diffusion meets 
several obstacles, which requires collaborative commitment and endeavor from promoters of 
the product. The amount of the resources needed brings the most powerful of them to take the 
lead and act as main drivers of the entire process. The actual structure of the market with its 
definitions, standards, indices and segments can be seen as the functionalist result of their 
endeavors.  Moreover, the analysis we led evidences the political nature of the ambiguities at 
stake. The fact that these ambiguities are dealt with by the main investment banks acting, as 
what is perceived by other actors of the market, as a specific cognitive and political 
community, provides an explanation for the relatively high concentration of the market. 
 
 
 
4- Discussion  
 
In 1993, in a speech which has since often been quoted, Charles Sanford Jr., the CEO of 
Bankers Trust, put forward his vision of the financial market in 2020. Traditional finance 
would be replaced by “particle” finance creating progress of the same nature as that brought 
about by quantum physics and molecular biology. In dividing up classical financial assets (a 
loan note, for instance) into risk particles (interest rate risk on the one hand, credit risk on the 
other), this new finance would permit us to “create order from apparent disorder”, “the 
amount of unwanted risk borne by individuals, institutions and the system as a whole” would 
be reduced in size. Even though credit derivatives were just emerging, and even though this 
wished for new finance seemed to him to be a distant aim at the moment of his speech, 
Charles Sanford Jr. named credit derivatives as the pioneers of this new way of envisioning 
finance and the economy. 
 
In this paper, we have evidenced the discrepancy between this ideal vision and the empirical 
reality of the market for credit derivatives. We have proposed to explain this gap, by taking 
into full account the specific features of the product. While credit derivatives result from an 
extension of the financial theory of risk developed on the basis of the Black and Scholes 
model, they fundamentally differ from options in that they bear no simple link with a traded 
underlying asset. Promoters of the product, by sticking to their theoretical apparatus, largely 
overlook the implications of this specificity. We demonstrate that many dimensions they take 
for granted are, in fact, rendered ambiguous by the very design of the product. Credit 
derivatives are not easily defined, categorized, legally qualified or valorized. They pose 
questions regarding who should be allowed to participate in the market and how ownership is 
transferred. They induce doubts concerning who will eventually benefit from the development 
of the market.  
 
Facing these practical difficulties, a specific category of actors has had to collectively 
organize and decide on the means by which these questions can be handled. The most 
interested and well-equipped promoters of the market take the lead and jointly commit to a 
standardization and normalization processes. They carry on collaborative actions to impose 
their “calculative device” (Callon and Muniesa 2005), to promote market liquidity and to 
alleviate suspicions from other actors. In so doing, they construct a cognitive and political 
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community, taking the role of creator of the rules of the game (Fligstein 2001). These 
dynamics cannot be expected to favor the adhesion of other actors who feel technically 
handicapped and uncertain about potential opportunism of the small group of active 
promoters. Hence, the ambiguities posed by credit derivatives are solved by social processes 
which eventually shape the market in such a way that opacity and concentration are 
practically unavoidable.  Remember that the theoretical rationalization of promoters of the 
product relies on the identification of credit risk to a classical market risk, which implicitly 
assumes atomistic, numerous and anonymous actors exchanging on the basis of highly 
transparent prices produced by a pure supply and demand mechanism. Ultimately then, what 
we observe is a sharp contradiction between the empirical reality and the rhetorical 
justification of credit derivatives as financial innovation. 
 
Our paper contributes to the understanding of financial markets in several ways.  
 
First, our study builds on Smith (1989) by acknowledging the crucial role played by 
uncertainty on the market for credit derivatives. Showing how ambiguities materialize 
through time, we provide a historical perspective in which the market appears as a 
functionalist work-in-progress solution to definitional and valorization uncertainties, as 
opposed to a given device assumed to manage well-defined risks. In this perspective, the 
conception of markets as definitional practices (Smith 2007) fits the market for credit 
derivatives extremely well. However, in contrast with Smith’s (1989) description of auction 
markets, the structure of credit derivative trading can not be accounted for by recognition of 
cognitive ambiguities only. Ambiguities of a political nature must be added to the analysis. 
The manner in which these two types of ambiguities are handled by those who have the 
greatest interest in the development of the market, and the most resources to devote to the 
cause, is central in explaining the actual structure of the market, its concentration and lack of 
transparency.  Although often overlooked or denied by the most active market promoters, this 
political dimension is recognized by other actors.  
 
Second, our paper emphasizes the role played by academic knowledge in the structuring of 
modern financial markets (Whitley 1986). Credit derivatives would not have seen the light 
were it not for the conceptual and computational matrix provided by Black, Merton and 
Scholes (1973) and their followers. In that perspective, the entire process of market promotion 
evidenced in this paper could be described as an attempt to perform the theory (Callon, 1998; 
MacKenzie and Millo 2003). Although the definition of performativity is currently strongly 
debated (MacKenzie 2006; MacKenzie et al. 2007), efforts of market promoters to make the 
credit derivatives market more like its depiction by the financial theory of risk18 (index 
creation, segment organization of the market, promotion of transparency and liquidity) seem 
to fit quite well with the empirical reality we observed.  
 
Yet, in contradiction with other works (MacKenzie and Millo 2003), what we evidence here is 
the relative failure of such an attempt. Our work provides some insight into the causes of this. 
When the setting surrounding a financial product is too distanced from the ideal assumptions 
of the financial theory of risk, it might prove extremely difficult for the market promoters to 
transform actors’ perceptions from “uncertainties” into “risks”. Whatever the significance of 
the resources devoted (Fligstein 2001), the power of large financial institutions seems to find 
a very serious limitation here. This suggests that there may be a limit to the extension of the 
financial theory to the objectification (LiPuma and Lee 2005) and marketization of new risks. 
                                                
18 Barnesian performativity in MacKenzie’s sense 
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It can be expected that attempts at having CAT-bonds, risks of attack or rights to pollute 
exchanged in financial markets to be hampered if actors feel that uncertainties are too real for 
them to be considered under a crude risk perspective, or if market promoters fail to push the 
market towards an acceptable approximation of the theoretical assumptions. According to 
Beck (1990: 61), risks might be seen as “the interminable needs sought by economists”, 
because needs that are open to interpretation can be proliferated endlessly (Beck 1992, 2006). 
In this paper, we show that the interpretation provided by the financial theory of risk might 
have more limited applicability than is generally acknowledged. 
 
Finally, our paper demonstrates the role played by private actors in the regulating and 
normalizing processes. Their lobbying capacity is a key issue in trying to ensure that the 
strongest actors’ interests prevail. General interest defense on sophisticated over-the-counter 
markets thus remains a question. Are the regulators in a position to guarantee the preservation 
of the common good? Who is responsible in times of crisis (Sassen 2005)? Observation of the 
social processes apparent in the credit derivatives market gives some relevance to the issue of 
the re-politicization of financial risks (de Goede 2004), as the recent subprime turmoil that 
occurred after we conducted this study, emphasizes.  
 
 
 
References  
 
Abolafia, Michael 
1996 Making Markets: Opportunism and Restraint on Wall Street. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Beck, Ulrich  
1990 “On the way toward an industrial society of risk”, International Journal of Political Economy, 
20: 51-69. 
 
Beck, Ulrich  
1992 Risk society: Towards a new modernity, London: Sage. 
 
Beck, Ulrich 
2006 “Living in the world risk society”, Economy and Society, 35: 329-345. 
 
Berg, Bruce 
2004 Qualitative research methods for the social sciences, Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
 
Beunza, Daniel, Iain Hardie and Donald MacKenzie 
2006 “A price is a social thing: Towards a material sociology of arbitrage”, Organization Studies, 27 
(5): 721-746. 
 
Black, Fisher and Myron Scholes 
1973 “The Valuation contracts and a test of market efficiency”, Journal of Finance, 27: 399-417. 
 
Callon, Michel 
1998 “Introduction: The embeddedness of economic markets in economics”, In Callon M., (Ed), The 
Laws of the market, Oxford: Blackwell:1-57. 
 
Callon, Michel, and Fabian Muniesa 
2005 "Economic markets as calculative collective devices" Organization Studies, 26: 1229-1250. 
 
     
 20 
De Goede, Marieke 
2004 “Repoliticizing financial risk”, Economy and Society, 33: 197-217. 
 
Fligstein, Neil 
2001 The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of 21st Century Capitalist Societies, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
 
Gauvin, Alain 
1999 Nature et régime juridique des dérivés de crédit, Ph.D. Thesis Sorbonne Paris 1, September 8. 
 
Gauvin, Alain 
2003, Droit des dérivés de crédit, Revue Banque Edition. 
 
Greenwood, Royston and Roy Suddaby 
2006 “Institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields: the big five accounting firms”, Academy of 
Management Journal, 49: 27-48. 
 
Jacobides, Michael 
2005 "Industry change through vertical disintegration: How and why markets emerged in mortgage 
banking ", Academy of Management Journal, 48 (3): 465-498.  
 
Knight, Frank 
1921 Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, New York: Houghton Mifflin.  
 
Kregel Jan 
1995  “Neoclassical Price Theory, Institutions, and the Evolution of Securities Market Organization” , 
Economic Journal, 105: 459-470. 
 
Lee, Allen 
1999 Using qualitative methods in organizational research, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Lincoln, Yvonna and Egon Guba 
1985 Naturalistic inquiry. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
 
Lounsbury, Michael and Ellen T.Crumley 
2007 “New practice Creation: an institutional perspective on innovation”, Organization Studies, 28(7): 
993-1012. 
 
LiPuma, Edward and Benjamin Lee 
2005  “Financial derivatives and the rise of circulation”,  Economy and Sociology, 34: 404-427. 
 
Maguire, Steve, Cynthia Hardy and Thomas Lawrence  
2004 “Institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields: HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada”, 
Academy of Management Journal, 47: 657-679. 
 
MacKenzie, Donald  
1990. Inventing accuracy: A historical sociology of nuclear missile guidance, Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press. 
 
MacKenzie, Donald 
2004 “The big, bad wolf and the rational market portfolio insurance, the 1987 crash and the 
performativity of economics”, Economy and Society, 33: 303-334. 
 
MacKenzie, Donald 
2006 An Engine, not a camera. How financial models shape markets, The MIT Press. 
     
 21 
 
MacKenzie, Donald and Yuval Millo  
2003 “Constructing a market, Performing theory: The historical sociology of a financial derivatives 
exchange”, American Journal of Sociology, 109: 107-145. 
 
MacKenzie, Donald, Fabian Muniesa and Lucia Siu (Eds) 
2007 Do economists make markets? On the performativity of economics, Princeton University Press. 
 
Maki, Uskali 
1992 “On the methods of isolation in economics”, in C.Dilworth (ed.), Intelligibility in science: 
Poznan studies in the philosophy of the sciences and humanities, Atlanta and Amterdam: Rodopi, Vol 
26: 319-354.  
 
Miles Matthew. and Michael Huberman  
1994 Qualitative data analysis  An expanded sourcebook (2nd ed), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Morgan, Glenn 
2008 “Market formation and governance in international financial markets: The case of OTC 
derivatives”, Human Relations, May, 61(5): 637-660. 
 
Reith, Gerda 
1999 The Age of Chance Gambling in Western Culture, Routledge. 
 
Sassen, Saskia 
2005, “The Embeddedness of Electronic Markets: The Case of Global Capital Markets”, in Knorr 
Cetina K. and A. Preda Eds, The Sociology of Financial Markets, Oxford University Press. 
 
Smith, Charles 
1989 Auctions: The Social Construction of Value. New York: Free Press. 
 
Smith, Charles 
2007 "Markets as definitional practices", The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 32 (1): 1-39. 
 
Strauss, Anselm and Juliet Corbin 
1994 “Grounded theory methodology. An overview”. In N. Denzin and Y.Lincoln (Eds), Handbook of 
qualitative research, Thousand Oaks, CA Sage: 273-285. 
 
Whitley, Richard 
1986 “The transformation of business finance into financial economics: the roles of academic 
expansion and changes in US capital markets”, Accounting, Organization and Society, 11 (2): 171-
192. 
 
Whitley, Richard 
2006 , “Understanding differences: Searching for the social processes that construct and reproduce 
variety in science and economic organization”, Organization Studies, 27 (8): 1153-1178. 
 
Whitley, Richard 
2008, “Varieties of knowledge and their use”, Organization Studies, 29 (4): 581-609. 
 
Yin, Robert  
1989 Case study research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
 
Zelizer Viviana 
1979. Morals and markets: The development of life insurance in the United States, New Brunsswick, 
NJ, Transactio. 
     
 22 
 
Zelizer Viviana 
1994. The  Social Meaning of Money, New York: Basic Books.  
 
Zuckerman, Ezra 
1999  “The categorical imperative. Securities Analysts and the illegitimacy discount“, American 
Journal of Sociology, 104 (5): 1398-1438. 
 
Zuckerman, Ezra 
2004 “Structural incoherence and stock market activity”, American Sociological Review, 69 (3): 405-
432.  
 
     
 23 
Table 1: Summary of main themes and data sources with illustrations & verbatims.  
 
 
Themes Data sources Verbatims or illustrations 
Economic justification Interviews with traders and 
economic experts 
 
 
Press articles 
 
Books and reports (Ex: Fitch’s 
inquiries) 
“This is a question of diversification”  
“The credit derivatives market 
contributed much in halting the 
systematic risk” 
Emphasis on risk management and risk 
allocation 
Statistics on the development of the 
market 
Lobbying dynamics Interviews with regulators, 
traders, jurists and members of 
ISDA 
 
 
Books and reports 
 
 
 
Press articles 
 
“Our lobbying achieved its target. The 
legal qualification debate has been 
resolved” 
“The ISDA has colossal clout and they 
lobby the regulators” 
A law thesis devoted to the question of 
the legal qualification of the product 
and that reflects the terms of the 
debates 
Emphasis on debates about the legal 
qualification of the product and about 
the risk diminution provided by credit 
derivatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Definitional 
issues 
Normalization and 
valorization processes 
Interviews with traders, ISDA 
and experts 
 
 
 
 
ISDA Reports 
 
“The first market problem was the 
absence of formalization of frameworks 
and definitions” 
“Market techniques have been 
standardized, the ISDA has declared 
what options are possible” 
Definition of the Master Agreement 
and credit definitions 
Heterogeneity of cultural 
and technical equipment 
of actors 
Interviews with mutual and 
hedge funds, insurance 
companies, banks 
 
“The market has been well accepted by 
the actors. The regulator, on the other 
hand, is less convinced”  
“It has to be said that it is a market of 
whodunits who have years of study 
behind them, who are engineers. They 
find it interesting because it’s 
complicated and that credit derivatives 
are funnier than interest rate 
derivatives” 
“ Bankers have often overcharged 
insurers who were not aware of the size 
of the risk because they didn’t have 
enough technical knowledge” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive 
and political 
communities 
Conflicts of interests Interviews with traders, 
regulators, insurance 
companies, mutual funds.  
 
 
 
 
Press articles 
 
“The insurance companies do not see 
any real interest in this market, they 
have the impression that the market is 
not very liquid, has not reached 
maturity, and they are not very keen. 
Insurance companies are not 
promoters of credit derivatives”  
Transcription of debates between 
banks, insurance companies, regulators 
and mutual funds 
 
Source: inspired from Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006: 33 
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Graph 1: Global evolution of credit derivatives market  
 
      
Source: From the British Bankers' Association Credit Derivatives Report 2006 
 
 
Table 2: Credit derivatives notional amounts per category of actors (in %) 
by the end of June 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banks 
 
Insurance 
companies 
 
Mutual 
funds 
 
 
Purchase 
of 
protection 
 
 
99.4% 
 
 
0.05% 
 
0.55% 
 
Sale  
of   
protection 
 
 
99.5% 
 
 
0.4% 
 
 
 
0.1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Banque de France • RSF • Results of a French survey on instruments of transfer of 
credit risk. June 2004 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of interviews 
 
Name Date Location 
Rodolphe Sahel- trader 
Richard Bruyère, expert 
Ludovic Plas- trader 
Richard Brague- trader 
P.J, insurance company19 
Alain Duchateau, regulator 
B.G, regulator 
Benoît Sellam, regulator 
G.D, hedge fund 
Alain Gauvin, expert 
Dominique Plihon, expert 
Y.D, trader 
C.C, trader 
Emmanuel Courant, trader-
mutual fund 
E.L, trader 
R.C, trader 
Michel Aglietta, expert 
Anne Demartini, regulator 
Fabrice Pansard, regulator 
Nadine Rigutto, regulator 
Gilbert Hibon, regulator 
Patrice Aguès, regulator 
P.C, insurance company 
Pierre-André Julliard 
H.T, trader 
L.S, trader 
Regis Copinot, trader 
P.J, trader 
F.P, trader 
Emmanuelle Setbon, ISDA 
Richard Metcalfe, ISDA 
R.T- hedge fund 
May 3, 2004 
June 6, 2004 
October 5, 2004 
October 5, 2004 
October 6, 2004 
December 7, 2004 
December 7, 2004 
January 18, 2005 
January 18, 2005 
April 5, 2005 
April 6, 2005 
April, 14, 2005 
April 14, 2005 
April 14, 2005 
 
April 15, 2005 
April 15, 2005 
April 15, 2005 
April 19, 2005 
April 19, 2005 
April 19, 2005 
April 20, 2005 
April 20, 2005 
April 21, 2005 
April 21, 2005 
June 28, 2005 
June 28, 2005 
June 29, 2005 
June 29, 2005 
June 29, 2005 
June 30, 2005 
June 30, 2005 
June 30, 2005 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
Paris 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
London 
                                                
19 Some actors preferred to keep their anonymity.  
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Loïc Fery trader 
Hubert Le Liepvre, trader 
T.F, -hedge fund 
July 1, 2005 
July 1, 2005 
July 1, 2005 
London 
London 
London 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: List of documents consulted 
 
Azarchs Tanya, “Demystifying Banks’ Use of Credit Derivatives”, Ratings-Direct, Standard 
and Poor’s, December 2003 
Bank of England “Developing a Supervisory Approach to credit Derivatives” Discussion 
Paper, December 1996 
Bank of England, “Credit Derivatives: Amended Interim Capital Adequacy Treatment”, 
Supervision and Surveillance Note, June 1997 
Bank of International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”, Basel, July 1988 
Bank of International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “The New 
Basel Capital accord”, Consultative Document, Basel, January 2001 
Bank of International Settlements, “71st Annual report”, Basel, July 2001, pp.123 and 
following 
Bank of International Settlements, “72nd Annual Report”, Basel, July 2002, pp.122 and 
following 
Bank of International Settlements, “73rd Annual Report”, Basel, July 2003, pp.105 and 
following 
Bank of International Settlements, “75th Annual Report”, Basel, July 2005, pp.113 and 
following 
Bank of International Settlements, “The Global OTC Derivatives Market at end-June 2001”, 
Basel, December 2001 
Bank of International Settlements, “OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the first Half of 
2003”, Basel, November 2003 
Bank of International Settlements, “Credit Risk Transfer”, Committee on the Global Financial 
System, January 2003. 
Bank of International Settlements, “OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the second Half of 
2003”, Basel, May 2004 
Bank of International Settlements, “Credit Risk Transfer”, The Joint Forum, March 2005. 
British Bankers’ Association, “Credit Derivatives Market to hit Global $740 billion by year 
2000”, June 1998 
British Bankers’ Association, Credit derivatives report, 2004. 
British Bankers’ Association, Credit derivatives report, 2006. 
Bruyère R., 2004, Les produits dérives de crédit, Economica, Collection AFTE. 
Buffet Warren, Berkshire Hathaway 2002 Annual Report 
Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI), “Banana Skins 2002: A CSFI Survey of 
the Risks Facing Banks”, CSFI 2002 
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Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI), “Banana Skins 2003: A CSFI Survey of 
the Risks Facing Banks”, CSFI 2003 
Commission Bancaire, “Instruments dérivés de credit, premières orientations en matière de 
traitement prudential”, Documents de discussion et d’étude n°1, Juin 1997 
Commission Bancaire, “Bulletin de la commission bancaire n°1”, Avril 1998, pp.8-14 
Commission Bancaire, “Introduction au rapport 2002 de la Commission Bancaire”, Juillet 
2003 
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), “Credit Risk Transfer”, Bank for 
International Settlements, January 2003 
European Central Bank, “Credit Risk Transfer by EU Banks: Activities Risks and Risk 
Management”, May 2004 
Federal Reserve Bank, “Supervisory Guidance for Credit Derivatives”, August 1996 
Federal Reserve Bank, “Application of Market Risk Capital requirements to Credit 
Derivatives”, June 1997 
FitchRatings “Global Credit Derivatives: Risk Management or Risk?”, Special Report, March 
2003. 
FitchRatings “Global Credit Derivatives: A Qualified Success”, Fitch, September 2003 
FitchRatings “Credit derivatives: a Case of Mixed Signals”, Fitch, Credit Market Research, 
December 2003. 
FitchRatings “Synthetic Index-Benchmarking Portfolio Performance”, Fitch, June 2003 
FitchRatings, Special report, Global Credit derivatives Survey, September 2006 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, “Developing A Supervisory Approach to 
Credit Derivatives, Comments of the ISDA” February 1997 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, “Credit Risk and Regulatory Capital”, 
March 1998 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, “2003 Credit Derivatives Definitions”,  
2003 
JP Morgan Chase, 2003, 2002 and 2001 Annual reports 
Introduction to counsel, Robin Potts QC, 19th May, 1997. 
Commission bancaire, Traitement prudentiel des instruments derives de credit, annexe 15. 
Résultats de l’enquête de place française sur les instruments de transfert de risque de crédit, 
Banque de France, revue de stabilité financière, Juin 2004. 
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Appendix 3: Repartition of articles analyzed 
 
   
Actors  Number % / Total 
Rating agencies   14 7.04 
Insurance companies  11 5.53 
Other categories  3 1.51 
Banks  65 32.66 
Stock Exchange  6 3.02 
Legal experts  13 6.53 
ISDA  22 11.06 
Regulators  39 19.60 
Hedge and mutual funds  26 13.07 
Total  199 100.00 
 
Appendix 4: The most represented words for each category of the actors of the market  
A text analysis was conducted on 199 articles dealing with credit derivatives. From this data 
set, we extracted 8854 different words and proceeded to manually select a set of terms related 
to the domain studied. Seventy-three “root” words were then conserved (risk, index, 
valorization, investor, regulation, AMF, credit risk, diversification, transparency…), 
integrating some 110 equivalences.  
 
For example, we observe that insurance companies are mostly associated to “loss” or 
“uncertainty” whereas hedge funds or mutual funds are associated to “decree”, “law”, 
“regulation” or “transparency”.  
 
 
Insurance companies 
SCOR–loss– technicality- growth–rating–uncertainty- downgrade- 
bargaining 
Banks 
Index – JP Morgan – return – liquidity – Enron – signature  
- credit risk- Standardization – risk - diversification 
accountable– costumers – risk management 
- credit risk management- credit default risk 
Experts-Legal experts 
legal – security– regulation – decree - Systemic –default–law–
uncertainty- Authorities – Enron –hedging– information - technicality 
– Basel committee 
ISDA 
 Outstanding notional amount –growth– documentation - rules- 
credit risk management- Volume – segment  
- credit risk 
Regulators 
Valorization –control –risk transfer–documentation – volatility –
credit default risk– norms – risk - 
regulation – crisis- confidence - innovation  
Hedge Funds-OPCVM 
Decree – law – AMF –legal– regulation - qualification 
Performance – volatility – security – arbitrage –rules- AMF approval 
Debate – transparency –protection –return  
Investor - segment 
 
Interpretation: 
We kept words that have a significant t-test equivalent to a statistically significant difference between the mean 
frequency score for the class and the sample. 
- Significant to 5% 
- Significant to 10% 
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Appendix 5 : Chronology of main events on the market 
1988: Basel 1 agreement (Cooke agreement): core principles for banking regulation and 
particularly credit risk. International regulation makes it obligatory for banks to cover the risk of their 
assets by sufficient capital. (The Basel committee on Banking supervision is a committee of banking 
supervisory authorities which was established by the central bank Governors of a group of ten 
countries in 1975.) 
1992: ISDA first uses the term "credit derivatives" to describe a new, exotic type of over-
the-counter contract 
 
1996: Law n°96-597 de “modernisation des activités financières” (financial activities 
modernization), contains the system applicable to financial instruments in France 
 
1997: Robin Potts opinion: legal decision that mentions that credit default swaps are not insurance 
contracts but financial products 
 
1997:  Development of CreditMetrics model by JP Morgan: a portfolio model destined for the 
management of credit risk.  
 
1999: Gauvin law thesis devoted to the question of the legal qualification of credit derivatives 
 
1999: Joint Forum for Financial Stability 
 
1999: First Credit derivatives definitions issued by ISDA 
 
1999 - 2003: Wave of crises and defaults: Railtrack, Parmalat, Enron, Conseco, Worldcom, 
Pacific Gas & Electric, Argentina… 
 
2001:  Basel 2 agreement: definition of the part of the regulatory capital for banks 
 
2001: French reinsurance group SCOR discontinues its credit derivative insurance activities  
 
2002: ISDA Master Agreement: the standard for governing future transactions 
 
2002: French decree on December 10, possibility given to the mutual fund companies to use 
credit derivatives 
 
2002: Construction of indices by banks 
 
2003: ISDA Credit Definitions: renewal of the documentation relating to credit derivatives, to 
facilitate exchanges, reinforce transactions and increase market liquidity.  
 
2003: Creation of TRAC-X: JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley’s indices join together  
 
2003: Creation of iBOXX, an indice launched by Deutsche Bank, ABN Amro, Citigroup, Société 
Générale 
 
2004: iBOXX and TRAC-X join together to ensure a sufficient quantity of exchanges to 
guarantee the liquidity of the index 
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